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Donee Payment of Gift Tax: Crane, Old Colony Trust, and the
Need for Congressional Action
Section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) imposes a
tax on ''the transfer of property by gift," 1 and section 2502(c) obligates donors to pay the tax. 2 Most donors satisfy this obligation with
income, savings, or proceeds from the sale of property that would
have been given to the donee if gifts were untaxed. Some donors,
however, are unwilling or unable to pay gift taxes,3 and the tax burden then falls on the donee.4 Whether donors realize taxable gain5
when their donees pay gift taxes has troubled tax planners for several
years.
.Diedrich v. Commissioner, 6 on which the Supreme Court has already heard oral arguments,7 squarely presents this issue. Relying
on Crane v. Commissioner 8 and Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis1. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(I}. The Code does not define the term "gift." See Hauser, Gift, Income
or What?, 15 ARK. L. REv. 294, 294 (1961) (''The definition of gifts has • . . been left to the
courts."). The courts have defined this term differently for income tax and gift tax purposes,
See Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Com.missioner, 160 F.2d 812, 814 (2d Cir. 1947); Com.missioner v.
Beck's Estate, 129 F.2d 243,246 (2d Cir. 1942). For income tax purposes, a "gift" is excludable
from the donee's gross income under I.R.C. § 102 only if the donor gives with "detached and
disinterested generosity." Com.missioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960). For gift tax ,
purposes, "(T]here must be a cessation of the transferor's dominion and control over the item
or items which comprise the subject matter of the transfer." Estate of Mandels v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 61, 67 (1975) (citations omitted); Weil v. Com.missioner, 31 B.T.A. 899, 906
(1934), ajfd., 82 F.2d 561 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 552 (1936); Ross v. Com.missioner, 28
B.T.A. 39, 43, appeal dismissed, 67 F.2d 989 (7th Cir. 1933).
2. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 442(a)(2), 95 Stat. 172, 320
(codified at I.R.C. § 2502(c)). I.R.C. § 2502(c) states: "[T]he tax imposed by section 2501 shall
be paid by the donor."
3. Comment, Tlte Tax Consequences of Net Gifts, 48 TENN. L. REv. 404, 404-05 (1981)
(citing Faber, Gift Tax Planning: Tlte New Valuation Tables; Net Gifts; Political Gifts; and Other
Problems, 31 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 1217, 1234-35 (1973), and Kopp, Gifts Subject lo .Donee
Payment of Tax: Timing, Risks and Computations, 21 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 375, 375-76
(1969)), lists several reasons why donors may refuse to pay gift taxes: (1) "insufficiency of cash
or other liquid assets"; (2) "inability or unwillingness to liquidate property to produce the
necessary cash"; (3) a desire "to limit the value of the gift"; (4) a desire ''to shift the realized
gain on the sale of appreciated gift property to a donee in a lower marginal income tax bracket"; and (5) a desire to give the donee experience in financial matters. See Suwalsky, Net Gifts
- A Critical Look at Johnson v. Com.missioner, 75-5 TAX MNGMT. (BNA) 2, 5-6 (1975).
4. See I.R.C. §§ 6324(b), 6901(a)(l)(A)(ili); Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6324-l(b), 301.6324-l(d).
5. Under I.R.C. § IOOl(a), gain from the sale or other disposition of property is the excess
of the amount realized over the adjusted basis in the property. I.R.C. § IOOl(b) states that the
amount realized is ''the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property
(other than money) received." The adjusted basis in property is computed under I.R.C. § 1016.
6. 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2204).
7. The Court heard oral arguments on February 24, 1982. For a summary of the arguments, see 1982 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-2 (Feb. 26, 1982).
8. 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (basis in property is not reduced by nomecourse indebtedness, and
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sioner ,9 the Eighth Circuit held that a donor whose donee paid the
gift tax realized gain to the extent that the tax payment exceeded the
donor's adjusted basis in the transferred property. 10 Underlying this
holding was the court's belief that the transaction was in part a sale
and in part a gift. 11 Viewing the gift tax payment as consideration
received by the donor, one can find the elements of a sale. After that
payment has been subtracted from the value of the property transferred, however, there remains a pure gift.
Among the courts of appeals, only the Eighth Circuit has
adopted the part-sale, part-gift theory. Most of the courts that have
addressed this issue have applied the net gift theory 12 and held that
upon sale of the property, the amount realized includes the amount of indebtedness from
which the seller is relieved).
9. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
10. 643 F.2d at 504. There was much support for the Eighth Circuit's position in the legal
literature. See, e.g., Del Cotto, Sales and Other .Dispositions of Property Under Section 1001:
The Taxable Event, Amount Realized and Related Problems ofBasis, 26 BUFFALO L. RE.v. 223,
305-17 (1977); Ward, Taxation of Gratuitous Transfers of Encumbered Property: Partial Sales
and Section 677/a}, 63 loWA L. RE.v. 823, 860-66 (1978) (apply part-sale, part-gift when trust
pays gift tax); Note, Federal Income Tax - Net Gfft .Doctrine - No Taxable Income Results
from Gf/t Given Subject to Condition That .Donee Pay Gfft Tax, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1074
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Cornell Note]; Note, Income Tax Consequences of Encumbered
Gffts: The Advent of Crane, 28 U. FLA. L. RE.v. 935, 945 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Florida
Note]; Note, Tax Consequences of Funding Trusts with Encumbered Property: The .Demise of
Section 677, 28 U. FLA. L. RE.v. 708, 722 (1976) (suggesting part-sale, part-gift theory should
be applied when trust pays gift tax) [hereinafter cited as Section 677 Note]; Note, Bad Newsfar
Net Givers: .Donee Payment of Gfft Taxes Results in Taxable Income to .Donor, 36 U. PITI. L.
RE.v. 517 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Pittsburgh Note]; Comment, Federal Income Tax -Income Taxation of Net Gffts After Hirst v. Commissioner, 32 RUTGERS L. RE.v. 389 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Rutgers Comment]; Comment, Assumption of Indebtedness by a .Donee:
Income Tax Consequences, 17 STAN. L. REV. 98, 98-99 (1964) [hereinafter cite~ as Stanford
Comment]; Note, Taxation - Conditional Net Gfft Transfers: No Income Tax Consequences to
.Donor - Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978), 52 TEMPLE L.Q. 139 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Temple Note].
,
11. The term "part-gift and part-sale" is a judicial creation used to describe the federal
income tax consequences of a transaction where the donor transfers property in return for
consideration less than the fair market value of the property. The donor is viewed as
having a dual intent: first, he is seen as having the intent to give a gift in the amount by
which the value of the property exceeds the value of the consideration; second, he is seen
as entering the transaction with the intent of deriving economic benefit from the consideration received, namely, the payment of his gift tax liability.
Owen v. Commissioner, 652 F.2d Adv. Sh. 1271, 1274 n.6 (6th Cir. 1981) (2-1) (case vacated
Sept 11, 1981, and ordered held in abeyance pending the disposition of Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (No. 80-2204)) (citation omitted).
Treas. Reg.§ 1.1001-l(e) (1972) states: "[W]here a transfer of property is in part a sale and
in part a gift, the transferor has a gain to the extent that the amount realized by him exceeds
his adjusted basis in the property."
The Commissioner developed the part-sale, nart-gift theory because he was unsuccessful in
taxing gain to trust settlers under I.R.C. § 677(a) when trustees discharged the gift tax liability.
For a review of those cases, see, Rutgers Comment, supra note 10, at 392 n.24; Comment, supra
note 3, at 409-11.
12. "A net gift is a gratuitous transfer of property in which the donor transfers property to
the donee conditioned upon the donee's agreement to pay the applicable gift tax resulting from
the transfer." Comment, supra note 3, at 404 (citations omitted); see Suwalsky, supra note 3, at
2 ("a gift of property subject to some encumbrance or obligation which may be either preexist-
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the donor does not have taxable income. 13 Under the net gift theory,
gifts are measured by subtracting the donee's gift tax payment frolll
the value of the property that he received. If the donor intended td
convey a gift, possible benefits to him from the donee's tax payment
are overlooked. 14
Neither of these approaches, this Note argues, is consistent with
both the Code and the broad policies underlying Congress' treatment of donative transactions. The net gift theory achieves results
that comport with congressional policy, but its focus on donative in. tent finds little support in the Code. The part-sale, part-gift theory
undermines Congress' policy toward gifts, but follows logically from
the Supreme Court's decision in Old Colony Trust. The Note concludes, therefore, that Congress should amend the Code to make
clear that liability for gift taxes is shared by donors and donees. By
ensuring that donee payments of gift taxes would riot constitute taxable gain to donors, this amendment would eliminate the inconsistency between Congress' goals and its operative language.
ing or which arises at the time of the gift" (footnotes omitted)); Florida Note, supra note 10, at
941~ Recent Decisions, Income Taxation ofNet G(fts - Hirst v. Commissioner, 38 Mo. L. REV.
llO, llO (1978) [hereinafter cited as Maryland Note].
The net gift concept first developed in litigation over the gift tax consequence of having the
donee pay the gift tax. The issue that had to be resolved was whether the gift tax was to be
computed against the value of the property originally transferred from the donor to the donee
- without regard to donee's payment of the gift tax - or whether the tax would be computed
against the net exchange - the value of the property transferred from the donor to the donee
less the donee's gift tax payment. The courts, reasoning that donor intended a gift equalling
the value of the property transferred less the gift tax payment, held that the gift tax was to be
computed against this "net gift." Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acq. 1952-2
C.B. 2; Lingo v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954).
13. Owen v. Commissioner, 652 F.2d Adv. Sh. 1271 (6th Cir. 1981) (decided on stare decisis grounds) (case vacated Sept. 11, 1981, and ordered held in abeyance pending the disposition of Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981)
(No. 80-2204)); Hirst v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 307 (1974), qlfd., 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978)
(en bane); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1363 (1971), qlfd. per ct1riam,
469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), qlfd. per curiam, 410
F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
The Tax Court has followed these circuit courts. See Estate of Weeden v. Co=issioner,
39 T.C.M. (CCH) 699 (1979), appeal docketed, No. 80-7127 (9th Cir. Apr. 9, 1980); Benson v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 989 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1032 (6th Cir. Jan 22,
1979); Bradford v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 79-1094 (6th Cir.
Feb. 13, 1979); Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 781340 (6th Cir. July 31, 1978); Krause v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1242 (1971). But the Tax
Court's support has been less than enthusiastic: "In substance a portion of the transferred
property equal in value to the amount of the gift tax is not treated as having been part of the
gift. But surely that portion did not vanish into thin air ..•. " Hirst v. Commissioner, 63
T.C. 307, 315 (1974), qlfd. per curiam, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane).
14. See Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 363 (1968), qlfd. per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
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THE NET GIFT AND PART-SALE, PART-GIFT THEORIES

A. The Net G!ft Theory
Net gift theorists look solely at the donor's intent to determine
whether a donee's gift tax payments are income to his donor. When
a donor intends to make a gift, the Tax Court has reasoned, he does
not intend to sell anything. 15 A donee's satisfaction of his donor's
gift tax liability does not alter the overall nature of a donative transaction.16 In Hirst v. Commissioner, 17 the Fourth Circuit adopted the
Tax Court's approach and held that no taxable benefit accrued to the
donor:
The predominant circumstance here is that this taxpayer did not intend
to sell anything; she intended only to give her property to her progeny.
She did not receiye anything for herself; there was no economic gain of
any kind accruing to her, except releasefrom the normal tax burden ofan
owner of real estate. 1_8

This conclusion, however, ignores both the language of the Code
and economic reality.
·
At the most basic level, the net gift theory fails to explain why a
donor's subjective intent should determine the income tax consequences of his actions. Taxpayers' subjective intent, one must concede, has little evidential value: Most taxpayers will claim to have
intended the course of action that minimizes their tax liability, and
neither the Internal Revenue Service nor the Supreme Court has devised a foolproof method for rebutting these claims. The Court has
thus concluded: "[T]he donor's characterization of his action is not
determinative . . . . It scarcely needs adding that the parties' expectations or hopes as to the tax treatment of their conduct in themselves have nothing to do with the matter." 19
The net gift theory also fails to recognize that a disposition of
property can exhibit elements of both a sale and a gift. A donor's
intent ''to give her property to her progeny'' is not evidence that she
15. See Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356 (1968), qffd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1969). In Turner, the donor transferred appreciated stock to nine donees. Three of these
gifts were made directly to the recipients while the other six gifts were made to trust accounts.
Each individual recipient and trustee signed a letter agreeing to pay the resulting gift tax as a
condition for receiving the gift.
The Turner court's intent argument has been perceived as the crux of its decision. See, e.g.,
Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427,430 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane); Florida Note, supra note
10, at 943; Comment, supra note 3, at 413.
16. Turner v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. at 362 (1968), qffd per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir.
1969) ("[A) condition imposed by the transferor-that the transferee will pay the gift tax resulting therefrom does not alter the result that the transfer constituted a gift.").
17. 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane). The Fourth Circuit originally decided Hirst for
the government on the part-sale, part-gift theory. See 572 F.2d at 434 (Winter and Butzner,
JJ., dissenting). On rehearing en bane, the court reversed its position. ·
18. 572 F.2d at 430 (emphasis added).
19. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960).
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received nothing for herself. Section 2502(c) of the Code imposes a
tax on persons who make gifts. Some donors, however, induce their
donees to pay this tax by conditioning the transfer on the donee's
payment of the gift tax. 20 Despite the donative nature of the overall
transaction, this bargained-for discharge of the donor's tax liability
may constitute taxable gain.21
Finally, because net gift theorists emphasize only the donor's intent, they often overlook the economic effects of a donee's agreement
to pay gift taxes.22 Donors are unlikely to condition gifts on their
donees' payment of gift taxes unless they believe that their action
will produce tax savings to the family or other unit. 23 Donees are
typically less wealthy than donors; if part of the property must be
sold to pay the gift tax, and the donee is in a lower tax bracket than
the donor, a net gift will reduce the unit's total tax liability.24 Alternatively, the donee, but not the donor, may have access to sufficient
20. See, e.g., Bradford v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584, 589 (1978), appeal docketed, No. 791094 (6th Cir. Feb. 13, 1979); Estate of Henry v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 665, 666-67 (1978),
appeal docketed, No. 78-1340 (6th Cir. July 31, 1978); Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, 30
T.C;M. (CCH) 1363, 1364-66 (1971), ojfd. per curiom, 469 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1972); Turner v.
Commissioner, 49 T.C. 356, 358 (1968), ojfd. per curiam, 410 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1969).
21. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929). The applicability of Old Colony Trust to the net gift situation is discussed in Part IC infto.
Under§ IOOI(a), gain on a sale or other disposition of property is the excess of the amount
realized over the adjusted basis of the transferred property. I.R.C. § IOOI(a). The amount
realized includes ''the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property
(other than money) received." I.R.C. § IOOl(b). Any amount realized must be recognized
unless the Code provides for nomecognition. I.R.C. §IOOl(c). Since no provision authorizes
nomecognition when a donee pays the gift tax, donors must recognize any gain that they
realize.
22. See, e.g., Diedrich v. Commissioner 643 F.2d 499,504 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S.
Ct 89 (1981) (No. 80-2204); Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1980);
Johnson v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974);
Temple Note, supra note 10, at 151; Tennessee Note, supra note 3, at 424-29; Rutgers Comment, supra note 10, at 406-11.
23. Congress generally treats the donor and donee as a single unit for tax purposes. See
text at notes 53-55 infto.
24. One could argue that the analysis of the taxable unit's tax liability does not properly
include an examination of income taxes. The amount of the gift tax paid on the transfer is the
same regardless of which party pays the tax. The only benefit to the unit is income tax savings
that result from having the donee pay the gift tax. But Congress has expressly sanctioned
donees' paying income taxes at their own lower tax rate on gain that accrues while in the hands
of the donor. See notes 53-55 infta and accompanying text. That the donees use these proceeds to pay the gift tax should therefore be irrelevant when measuring benefit to the taxable
unit The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether the government receives less in gift tax proceeds; since the gift tax payment is the same, there is no benefit to the unit from having the
donee pay the gift tax.
This argument, while appealing at first blush, is unpersuasive. Congress does tax gain that
accrues in the donor's hands at the donee's tax rate when the donee sells the appreciated property, but it does so because the code provisions governing the transfer, §§ 102 and 1015, make
the underlying transfer a nontaxable event (for income tax purposes). The provision in question here, § 2502(c), forces realization because it imposes an obligation that must be satisfied at
the time of the transfer. Satisfaction of that obligation neccessarily diverts resources that could
be used for other purposes. Those resources, in turn, must be earned, and an income tax must
be paid on those earnings. The proper inquiry includes an examination of both the income tax
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funds to pay the tax without selling the property; a net gift would
enable the unit to defer recognition of gain until the donee_ disposed
of the property in a taxable transaction.
B. The Part-Sale, Part-G!ft Theory and the Crane Doctrine
The part-sale, part-gift theory recognizes the multidimensional
nature of some donative transactions. Courts adopting this theory
argue that both parties benefit from a gift conditioned on the donee's
payment of the gift tax. The benefit to the donee is clear, but nontaxable if the donor has satisfied the requirements of section 102.25
The benefit, if one exists, to the donor lies in _the discharge of the
obligation imposed on him by section 2502(c).26 In Diedrich,27 the
Eighth Circuit relied in part on the principle established in Crane v.
Commissioner 28 to hold that such a discharge conferred a taxable
benefit on the donor.29 This Section establishes that the analogy to
and gift tax consequences of having the donee pay the gift tax, for to limit the inquiry to the
gift tax would ignore the donor's principal motivation for having the donee pay the gift tax.
This analysis is proper regardless of the source of money used to satisfy the gift tax because
the benefit to the unit results from the difference in the tax rates of the donor and donee, not
from how the money is raised to pay the gift tax.
25. I.R.C. § 102(a) states that a donee's "gross income does not include property acquired
by gift."
26. See Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499, 501 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89
(1981) ("the payment of federal gift taxes is the legal responsibility of the donor'') (footnote
omitted); Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d at 438 (Thomsen, J., dissenting) (''taxpayer was
primarily responsible for the payment of those gift taxes"); Estate of Levine v. Commissioner,
634 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1980) (dictum) ("the gift tax ..• is a personal liability of the donor'').
27. Diedrich v. Commissioner, 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981)
28. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
29. A pure net gift situation exists where the donee pays the gift tax for the donor. The iwo
cases before Diedrich that applied the part-sale, part-gift theory involved pre-existing encumbrances. See Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 791 (1973), qffd., 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
The Diedrich court found that the lack of a pre-existing encumbrance did not distinguish the
case before it from Johnson and Estate of Levine and held for the Commissioner based on
those two cases. 643 F.2d at 503-04.
In Johnson, three taxpayers took out nomecourse loans against highly appreciated stock
and transferred the encumbered stock to a trust set up for their children's benefit. The trustees
replaced the taxpayers' notes with their own notes, again pledging the stock as collateral. This
gave the taxpayers the loan proceeds free from any obligation to repay the loan. The taxpayers
used part of the loan proceeds to pay their gift taxes. 495 F.2d at 1080. They conceded that
the money not used to pay the gift taxes was income to them, but argued that the money used
to pay gift taxes was not income to them under the Turner net gift theory. 495 F.2d at 1081.
The Sixth Circuit, while rejecting the part-sale, part-gift label, 495 F.2d at 1082 n.6, held
against the taxpayers because the transfer of stock had produced an economic benefit to them
equal to the amount of the loan proceeds. 495 F.2d at 1083. The court went on to state that
the receipt of the loan proceeds used to pay the gift tax could be viewed as payment of the
taxpayers' obligation by the trusts and thus constituted income to the donors-taxpayers under
Old Colony Trust. Alternatively, the transfer could be viewed as a shedding of a debt by
transferring the encumbered stock, and therefore income under Crane. 495 F.2d at 1083.
Moreover, the court limited Turner: "[T]he Turner case does not support the taxpayers' position. Turner has no precedential value beyond its peculiar fact situation, in view of the Com-
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Crane is imperfect and that the Crane doctrine does not justify the
Eighth Circuit's conclusion.
The Supreme Court held in Crane that the basis of inherited
property could not be reduced by the amount of nonrecourse indebtedness30 and that the amount realized on a sale of encumbered property includes the remaining indebtedness. 31 Release from
nonrecourse indebtedness, the Crane Court argued, gives the seller
an economic benefit "as real and substantial as if the mortgage was
discharged or as if a personal debt in an equivalent amount had been
assumed by another."32 Once basis is not reduced by nonrecourse
indebtedness, the Court added, "the functional relation[ship]" between the Code's basis and the amount realized provisions requires
that such indebtedness also be included in the amount realized on a
disposition of the property.33 "If the indebtedness were included only
in basis, taxpayers could offset income tax liability by depreciating
property purchased with borrowed funds, sell the property subject to
missioner's concessions in that case both in the Tax Court and on appeal to this Court." 495
F.2d at 1086.
In Estate ofLevine, the taxpayer made gifts of real estate in trust for three grandchildren in
return for the trustee's assumption of mortgage and interest payments on nonrecourse loans
against the property. The trustee also assumed the obligation to pay certain operating expenses previously incurred by the donor. 634 F.2d at 13. The Commissioner contended that
the donor owed income taxes on the amount by which the assumed liabilities exceeded the
donor's adjusted basis in the transferred property. Judge Friendly held for the Commissioner,
finding that the trustee's assumption of the donor's personal obligations provided the requisite
"'sale' element" to allow the transaction to be governed by Crane. 634 F.2d at 16.
Although Judge Friendly agreed with the Johnson decision and the Hirst dissent, he reserved judgment on whether Crane applies when property is donated subject to a nonrecourse
debt and there is no "'sale' element." 634 F.2d at 17.
30. 331 U.S. at 11.
31. 331 U.S. at 13 ("amount of the mortgage is properly included in the 'amount realized'
on the sale").
32. 331 U.S. at 14
33. 331 U.S. at 12 ("[T]he functional relation of the two sections [the basis and the amount
realized sections] requires that the word ['property'] mean the same in one section that it does
in the other."). See Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt andAmount Realized: The Demise of Crane's
Footnote 37, SO OR. L. REv. 3, 9-10 (1980). In a purchase money mortgage situation like that
in Crane, depreciation deductions are an important tie between the two sections. The Court
acknowledged that "[t]he crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her [Mrs. Crane]
to exclude allowable deductions from consideration in computing gain." 331 U.S. at 15 (footnote omitted). See Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the Crane Doctrine: An Imagl•
nary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REv. 159, 169-70 (1966); Bittker, Tax Shelters,
Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane Code, 33 TAX L. REv. 277,282 (1978) ("the tax consequences
of the taxpayer's dealings with her property [are brought] into harmony with economic reality
by recapturing her depreciation deductions to the extent that they exceed her investment");
Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects in
Mortgage Financing, 18 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 74 (1969) ("The controlling force behind the
Court's decision in Crane was probably its concern for depreciation policy.").
.
For a discussion of the relationship between basis, debt, and depreciation, see Rubin, How
Mortgages Affect Basis: The Rules Are in Accord with Economic Reality, 13 J. TAX. 38 (1960);
Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt and Basis: Mrs. Crane, Where Are You Now?, 53 S. CAL. L. Rev.
1 (1979).
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the encumbrance, and never be forced to account for the proceeds of
the loan.
Most commentators agree that the rationale underlying Crane
applies in two situations.34 Transferors of property realize gain
when they take out nonrecourse loans against the property's appreciated value and then transfer the property subject to the indebtedness.35 Transferors also realize gain when they acquire property
with a purchase money mortgage and then dispose of the property
after taking depreciation deductions in excess of their cash investment.36 These situations share one characteristic: the transfer eliminates a pre-existing indebtedness and thus violates the premise that loans must be repaid - on which the transferor was granted tax
immunity on the proceeds of the loan.37 Although loan proceeds are
not taxable, they do produce current economic benefits to borrowers.
Crane's realization principle may thus be understood as seeking to
ensure that transferors account for the tax-free benefits previously
derived from borrowed funds. 38 Viewed in this way, Crane does not
34. See, e.g., Bacas, Gifts ofProperty Subject to Indebtedness: Johnson v. Commissioner, 44
GEO.WASH. L. REv. 86, 110 (1975); Bittker, supra note 33, at 284; Del Cotto, supra note 33, at
95.
35. See, e.g., Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974); First Natl. Indus. v.
Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 608, 610, 616 (1967); Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 649 (1951), qffd., 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952); cf. Malone v. United States, 326 F. Supp.
106, 111, 113 (N.D. Miss. 1971), qffd., 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972) (donor has taxable gain
when donee assumes mortgage taken out against appreciated value of property; Crane not
applied).
36. See, e.g., Evangelista v. Commissioner, 629 F.2d 1218, 1224-25 (7th Cir. 1980); Parker
v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459 (1st Cir. 1950); Guest v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 9, 24-25 (1981);
Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320, 324 (1947); cf. Simon v. Commissioner, 285
F.2d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 1960) (release from mortgage taxable gain to seller; Crane not applied).
37. See, e.g., Woodsam Assocs. v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952); Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 320, 323 (1947); Simmons, supra note 33, at 16.
38. See, e.g., Bacas, supra note 34, at 110; Bittker, supra note 33, at 282-84; Simmons, supra
note 33, at 4, 17.
No less than five different theories have been offered to explain Crane. Professor Simmons
argues that the Crane doctrine taxes borrowed funds that had previously escaped taxation
because of the expectation that the funds would be invested in the property. Simmons, supra
note 33, at 21, 34. Professor Bittker argues, in a slightly different vein, that Crane should be
viewed as a balancing entry made at the time of the transfer to bring "the tax consequences of
the taxpayer's dealings • . . into harmony with economic reality by recapturing depreciation
deductions to the extent that they exceeded her investment in the encumbered property." Bittker, supra note 33, at 282; cf. Adams, supra note 33, at 169-70 (depreciation deductions must be
accounted for). Professor Del Cotto offers an alternate interpretation: Crane only applies
when the fair market value of the transferred property exceeds the amount of the indebtedness;
when this is not the case, and the debt is nonrecourse, the transferor realizes gain under Crane
up to the fair market value of the property and the remaining benefit to the taxpayer is taxed
under the tax benefit rule. If the debt is personal, the discharge of indebtedness doctrine governs. Del Cotto, supra note 10, at 317-26.
Bacas suggests that Crane is designeg to make the taxpayer account for past advantages of
owning property, which was either acquired with borrowed funds or borrowed against after
acquisition. Bacas, supra note 34, at 110-11.
·
Chief Judge Magruder, in a concurring opinion in Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459-60
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support the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that a donee's payment of
the gift tax conferred a taxable benefit on the donor.
The facts of Diedrich, typical of the gift tax cases, differ substantially from the two paradigmatic applications of the Crane doctrine;
no tax-free benefit had accrued to the donor prior to the transfer of
property. A taxpayer who transfers property subject to a loan taken
out against its appreciated value or subject to a purchase money
mortgage has an obligation to repay the loan that predates the transfer. A transfer removes this obligation, and the previously untaxed
benefit becomes properly taxable under Crane. But a donor whose
donee makes gift tax payments receives an economic benefit only
after he makes the transfer, for only then does gift tax liability accrue. Because no antecedent obligation is removed or previous taxfree benefit enjoyed, the Crane doctrine, as generally interpreted,39
does not apply when the donee pays the gift tax.
C. The Part-Sale, Part-Gift Theory and Old Colony Trust
The Eighth Circuit also drew support for its part-sale, part-gift
theory from Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 40 where the
Supreme Court considered whether a taxpayer received taxable income when his employer paid his income tax pursuant to a corporate
(1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951), suggests that these realization problems could
be avoided if basis equalled equity, with depreciation deductions in excess of equity producing
a negative basis. See Simmons, supra note 33, at 34-35 for criticism of the judge's suggestion.
All but Judge Magruder's theory address the question of whether footnote 37 of Crane
should limit the amount realized from a transfer. In footnote 37 the Court stated that the fair
market value of the encumbered property could limit the amount realized:
[I]fthe value of the property is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is
not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the _property or
transferred it subject to the mortgage without receiving boot That is not this case.
331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
According to Professors Simmons and Bittker and Mr. Adams, the Crane Court's economic
benefit argument does not adequately explain the tax consequences of transferring property
subject to nonrecourse indebtedness. See Bittker, supra note 33, at 285 n.14 ("the economic
benefit theory should be rejected as wholly fallacious"); Simmons, supra note 33, at 10 ("the
Court was misled to believe that the value of encumbered property at the time of disposition
was significant"); Adams, supra note 33, at 169-70. The Service has also repudiated footnote
31. See Treas. Reg. § l,1001-2(b). This Note agrees with these authorities that footnote 37
and the economic benefit theory do not adequately explain the tax consequences of transfers of
encumbered property.
39. See Bacas, supra note 34, at 110-1 I; Bittker, supra note 33, at 282-83; Simmons, supra
note 33, at 21. Professor Del Cotto, however, argues that Crane applies when the donee pays
the gift tax. According to Del Cotto, the donor slieds a "debt - the gift tax obligation - at the
time of the transfer, receiving a debt cancellation benefit that is an amount realized under
Crane. Del Cotto, supra note 10, at 313. Del Cotto's debt cancellation argument is tantamount to an economic benefit analysis because it focuses on the amount of the liability at the
time of transfer and limits the amount realized to the fair market value of the property. See id.
at 296, 318, 322-23. This Note expressly rejects the economic benefit analysis and its footnote
37 limitation because it fails to account for the previous economic benefits to the donor. See
note 38 supra.
40. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
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resolution. The Court ruled out the possibility that the payment
constituted a gift and held that relief of income tax liability should
be treated as income. ''The discharge by a third person of an obligation to him," the Court argued, "is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed."41 On its face, Old Colony Trust seems to require holding
that a donor has taxable gain when his donee pays the gift tax,42 but
several objections must be addressed before finalizing this
conclusion.
One could, for example, attempt to distinguish Old Colony Trust
on the ground that the obligation to pay gift taxes is shared by do- ·
nors and donees, while taxpayers are solely responsible for their income taxes. The gift tax is an "excise levied upon the donor's
privilege of making transfers of property,"43 for which the donor is
personally and primarily liable.44 Although donees become personally liable for payment of the gift tax if their donors fail to pay when
the tax comes due,45 this secondary liability does not amount to a
shared obligation. The "special lien" created by section 6324(b) does
41. 279 U.S. at 729. Accord, United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1937); cf. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1937) (requiring a corporation to recognize
gain on cash transferred to its shareholders in exchange for the shareholders' agreement to
assume the corporation's debts where the cash transferred equalled the debts assumed); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935) (holding that payments to a beneficiary from trust income
were income to the settlor because the payments were in discharge of the settlor's legal obligation to make payments to the beneficiary).
42. The commentators who favor the application of the part-sale, part-gift theory when the
donee pays the gift tax disagree on whether the theory is based on Old Colony Trust, Crane, or
both decisions. Most argue that both decisions are applicable. See, e.g., Del Cotto, supra note
IO, at 310-13; Florida Note, supra note 10, at 944-47; Rutgers Comment, supra note 10, at 408
n.136, 409-11; Temple Note, supra note 10, at 148-50; Comment, supra note 3, at 431. Two
Notes suggest that Old Colony Trust alone is the proper basis for decision. Cornell Note, supra
note IO, at 1081-82; Maryland Note, supra note 12, at 115-19 (discharge of debt).
43. Kopp, supra note 3, at 375; cf. B. BITIKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, EsTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION 990 (4th ed. 1972) ("estate tax is levied on the privilege of transmitting
property at death, while an inheritance tax is on the privilege of receiving"); C. SttouP, PuBuc
FINANCE 372 n.37 (1969) (comparing inheritance tax with estate tax).
44. See I.R.C. §§ 2502(c), 6321 (imposing a lien on all of a taxpayer's personal property
whenever a tax is not paid when due); Treas. Reg. § 25.2502-2 (1973); see also Mississippi
Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 186, 187 (8th Cir. 1945); Baur v. Commissioner,
145 F.2d 338, 339 (2d Cir. 1944); Fletcher Trust Co, v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 36, 39 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 711 (1944).
45. I.R.C. § 6324(b) (''If the tax is not paid when due, the donee of any gift becomes personally liable for the tax to the extent of the value of his gift."); Treas. Reg.§ 301.6324-l(b)
(1973); see Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 186, 187 (8th Cir. 1945);
Baur v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 338, 339 (2d Cir. 1944); Fletcher Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
141 F.2d 36, 39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 711 (1944) (liability of donee is secondary).
The only condition precedent to the donee's liability is the donor's failure to pay the gift
tax. See Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d at 187-88. The donor's solvency is immaterial, see Baur v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d at 340; Winton v. Reynolds, 57 F.
Supp. 565, 567 (D. Minn. 1944), and the Commissioner need not first proceed against the
donor, see Moore v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 14, 15 (1942), qffd., 146 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1945).
One court has even held that the donee has no cause of action against the donor for reimbursement. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Anthony, 13 NJ. Super. 596, 609, 81 A.2d 191, 198 (Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1951) ("mere making of a gift does not carry with it any implied promise by the
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not create an indebtedness to the government; 46 it "is merely a security established by statute for the benefit of the taxing authority in the
event of a default in payment of the tax."47
One might also distinguish Old Colony Trust and .Diedrich based
on how the tax obligations arose. In Old Colony Trust, the income
tax liability arose from an exchange of services for money; "[t]he
payment of the tax by the employers""was in consideration of the
services rendered by the employee and was a gain derived by the
employee from his labor." 48 Even if the employer had not assumed
responsibility for paying the employee's income tax, there was an
exchange that produced income tax consequences. If the Old Colony
Trust doctrine is applied in gift tax cases, it will create income tax
consequences in an otherwise tax-free transfer. While one could argue that Old Colony Trust should not be extended to cases where
there is no exchange of benefits· between the parties other than payment of the tax that arises from the initial transfer, this objection
seems groundless. The Code expressly requires that the donor pay
the gift tax, and the donees in cases like .Diedrich discharged that
obligation ''upon a valuable consideration."49
A final objection to applying Old Colony Trust is that donors do
donor to pay the tax"), q/fd on other grounds sub nom. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Heller, 18
NJ. Super. 49, 86 A.2d 594 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952)
46. See 9 J. ·MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 54.38, at 89 (rev. ed. 1977)
(discussing liens generally).
41. Id. at 90.
This construction, which argues that § 6324 does not create an independent obligation but
only provides a means for collecting the gift tax that is due from the donor, see Johnson v.
Commissioner, 495 F.2d 1079, 1083 n.7 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974) ("Donee's
liability is . . . in the nature of a lien rather than an alternative source of personal liability at
the taxpayers' option, at least before the tax is actually due and payable); H.R. REP. No. 708,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1932) ("By this section
there is imposed a lien additional to that imposed by Section 3186 ...•"). But see Moore v.
Commissioner, 146 F.2d824, 825-26 (2d Cir. 1945), which is consistent with the plain language
of§ 2502(c) and with Congress' purpose, Comment, Intemal Revenue Code Section 6)24: Tlte
Special Estate and Gift Tax Liens, 11 GoNZ. L. REv. 534, 534 (1976) ("Congress •.• enacted
special liens . . . to aid in the collection of . . . gift taxes.") (citation omitted); cf. Detroit Bank
v. United States, 317 U.S. 329,337 (1943) (per Stone, C.J.) ("in the case of the tax on property
passing at death . . . there is greater need of a lien in advance of assessment and demand for
payment of the tax than in the case of other types of taxes").
Section 6901(a)(l)(A)(iii) also creates no new obligation on the part of the donee, but facilitates collection of the gift tax. See Moore v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d at 825; 9 J. MERTENS,
supra note 46, at § 53.01, at 3 n.10; id at § 53.05, at 9; Comment, Section 6901: Transferee
Liability, 30 TAX LAW. 433, 434 (1977); c.f. United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 175, 177 (10th
Cir. 1976) (applying the analogous provision for collection of estate taxes); United States v.
58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (stockholder transferees
liable for corporate taxes).
Two other commentators have noted the question as to who has the obligation to pay the
gift tax. Ward, supra note 10, at 859-61; Stanford Comment, supra note 10, at 104-05. Both
argue that the donee's contingent liability is irrelevant because in the net gift and part-sale,
part-gift cases, the donee pays the gift tax before it becomes due, ie., before he is personally
liable for the tax.
48. 279 U.S. at 729.
49. 279 U.S. at 729.
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not necessarily receive an economic benefit from their done.e's gift
tax payments. It has already been demonstrated, however, that gifts
conditioned on the donee's payment of the gift tax produce economic
benefits to family or other units.50 These benefits, moreover, may
not accrue solely to donees. Donors who are aware of the tax savings that donees in lower tax brackets realize when disposing of appreciated property could, in effect, finance part of their gifts with
these savings. A smaller conditional transfer could produce the
same after-tax gift to the donee and thus the same level of satisfaction to the donor while allowing the donor to conserve a larger share
of his assets.
·
In conclusion, the Eighth Circuit's part-sale, part-gift tjieory is
properly grounded in the Supreme Court's opinion in Old Colony
Trust. Part II will argue, however, that the Court's theory is inconsistent with Congress' general approach to donative transfers.
II. RECONCILING CONGRESSIONAL POLICY AND THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE

Although the sparse legislative record51 reveals some ambivalence, Congress has traditionally tailored tax policy to encourage gift
giving.52 The net effect of most of Congress' policies toward gifts has
50. See text at notes 22-24 supra. Congress generally treats the donor and donee as a
single unit for tax purposes. See text at notes 53-55 infra.
51. The problem with interpreting the congressional intent behind § 2502(c) is that the
provision's wording has not changed since it was enacted in 1924. Accordingly, the legislative
history on the provision is concentrated in the 1920s and 1930s. But that legislative history
reveals little. The predecessor to § 2502(c) read: "Time of Payment - The tax imposed by
section 319 shall be paid by the donor on or before the 15th day of March." Gift Tax Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 324, 43 Stat. 253, 316 (1924). In 1932, when the gift tax was reenacted, the section imposing liability on the donor used most of the language of the 1924
version. Revenue Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154, § 509(a), 47 Stat. 169, 253 (1932). The
legislative history only stated that "[t]he tax is payable on or before the due date of the return."
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1932), reprinted in 1 LAW, REPoRTS, MlsCELLANY
30 (Revenue Act of 1932) (Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library). During the 1939 codification the section number was changed, but the wording remained the same. Internal Revenue Code, Pub. L. No. 76-1, § 1008(a), 53 Stat. 1, 148 (1939).
In 1954, the section was changed to read: ''The tax imposed by section 2501 shall be paid by
the donor." Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 2502(d), 68A Stat. 3, 404.
Without discussion, the date of payment provision was moved to another subsection of§ 2502.
See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 478, reprinted in [1954) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 4621, 5122 (''This section is derived from section . . . 1008(a) of the 1939 code. No
change in substance has been made."); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A321, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 4017, 4465 (same). In 1981, Congress moved
the provision from I.R.C. § 2502(d) to I.R.C. § 2502(c), without explanation. See Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 442, 95 Stat. 172,320 (1981) (codified at I.R.C.
§ 2502(c)).
52. Since the reenactment of the gift tax in 1932, Gift Tax Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-154,
§ 501-32, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59 (1932), gift giving has been given preferential treatment over the
transfer of property at death, though this preference was reduced by the Tax Reform Act of
1976. Before 1976, inter vivos gifts had five advantages over transferring property at death.
First, gift tax rates were 75% of estate tax rates. Second, unlike estate taxes, the gift tax was not
included in the tax base. See Harrison v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1350 (1952), acq., 1952-2
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been to treat the donor and donee as a single unit for tax purposes. 53
Section 102, for example, excludes gifts from the donee's gross income,54 and section 1015 requires the donee to assume the donor's
basis in the transferred property.55· Section 2502(c)'s statement that
the donor is to pay the gift tax is inconsistent with this single unit
analysis, but it may not entirely reflect Congress' thinking on the
subject. Congressmen have generally assumed that the donor would
usually pay that tax;56 during the debates on the original gift tax,
C.B. 2; Lingo v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 436 (1954). Third, because gift and estate
taxes were computed on separate rate schedules, the total estate and gift tax bill could be
reduced by splitting property transfers between inter vivos gifts and passing property at death.
Fourth, the exemptions and multiple exclusions for gifts could be used without affecting the
estate tax exemption. Fifth, income from gifts of property could be shifted from a taxpayer in
a high income tax bracket to one in a lower tax bracket. For a discussion of these advantages,
see JOINT COMMIITEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF
1976, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 526-27, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 538-39; Eisenstein, The Rise and
Decline oftlze Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 243-45 (1956); Harriss, Gifts During Life, in
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFI' TAXES 174 (C. Shoup ed. 1966).
These advantages were greatly reduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). The most important change was the replacement of the separate rate
schedule with a unified rate schedule applied to both gifts and transfers at death. Tax Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-455, §§ 2001, 2010, 2035, 2101, 2505, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-54 (1976)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the Code).
53. Under the single unit analysis, the underlying transfer of property escapes taxation.
See notes 54-55 infra. In essence, the donee steps into the shoes of the donor. The tax treat•
ment reflects an attitude that gift giving is not a transaction that produces income, unlike
transfers in the marketplace for goods, services, and capital, and therefore is not one that
should be taxed. Most commentators disagree with this analysis. See, e.g., H. SIMONS, PER•
SONAL INCOME TAXATION 127-45 (1938) (gift should be income to the donee because it increases donee's wealth); Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and
Bequests in Income, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1177 (1978); Klein, An Enigma in tlze Federal
Income Tax: The Meaning of tlze Word Gift, 48 MINN. L. REv. 215, 215 (1963). But see R.
GooDE, TuE INDMDUAL INCOME TAX 98-100 (rev. ed. 1976) (suggesting that gift giving
should be viewed as the sharing of income among dependents and close relatives, not creation
of new income).
The repeal ofl.R.C. § 102 is unlikely. See Osgood, Carryover Basis Repeal and Reform of
tlze Tranefer Tax System, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 297,299 (1981) ("Section 102 appears to have
wide support and no serious attempts have been made in recent years to alter it.") (footnote
omitted).
54. I.R.C. § 102(a) states that "[g]ross income does not include the value of property ac•
quired by gift."
55. The donee assumes the donor's basis for computing gain on a subsequent sale of the
property. I.R.C. § I015(a). The donee can reduce his basis while he holds the property. See
I.R.C. §§ 1016(a), 1016(b). For computing losses on the sale of the property, the donce's basis
is the lesser of the donor's basis and the fair market value of the property at the time of
transfer. I.R.C. § 1015(a). This prevents a donor from giving a loss on property to a taxpayer
who could better use the loss to avoid tax liability. See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
27 (1934); s. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1934); M. CHIRLESTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, f 4.01, at 56-58 (2d ed 1979); 3A J. MERTENS, supra note 46, at§ 21.48, at 130 n.J.
56. See S. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in (1970] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5689, 5703 (''The Committee sees no reason for giving donors any more gift tax
deferral than is accorded taxpayers generally.") (discussing amendment requiring payment of
gift tax on a quarterly basis); 79 CoNo REc. 12,302 (1935) (statement of Rep. Cooper) ("tax
. . . is levied on donor''); Proposed Increase in Federal Tax: Hearings on R.R. 671S Before tlze
Senate Committee on Finance, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1924) (statement of Secretary of Treasury Mellon) ("unlike any other tax that I know of - the one who gives pays the tax, and not
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however, the sponsor of the gift tax amendment that eventually became law stated that "[i]t is immaterial whether the donor or the
donee pays it."57
The Eighth Circuit's part-sale, part-gift theory, while consistent
with section 2502(c)'s language, undermines Congress' preferential
treatment of gifts by forcing donors to realize gain on their transfers.
Family or other units do receive economic benefits when the donee
pays the gift tax,58 but Congress has sanctioned the receipt of such
benefits; it allows the donor to decide both who realizes gain from
the one who receives"), reprinted in 4 LAW, REPORTS, MlscELLANY 61 (Revenue Act of 1924)
(Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library); 65 CONG. REc. 3173
(1924) (statement of Rep. Mills) (''Why do you impose a tax on the donor?"). President
Roosevelt proposed a succession, inheritance, and legacy tax in 1935. The bill containing the
proposal stated that the tax was "in addition to the gift tax on the donors." H.R. 8974, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1935), reprinted in 16 BILL IN ITS VARIOUS FORMS 59 (Revenue Act of 1935)
(Carlton Fox Collection of the University of Michigan Law Library); cf. H.R. REP. No. 1681,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), reprinted in 9 LAW, REPoRTS, MlsCELLANY 10 (Revenue Act of
1935) (bill imposes tax ''upon the right to receive property by gift") (Carlton Fox Collection of
the University of Michigan Law Library).
Apparently, all commentators also assumed that the donor would pay the gift tax. See.,
e.g., A.L.I., FEDERAL GIFr & EsTATE TAXATION RECOMMENDATIONS 89 (1969); Alexander,
Federal Estate & G!ft Taxation: Tlte Major Issues in the American Law Institute Project, 22
TAX L. REv. 635, 651 (1967); Faber, supra note 3, at 1234 (''the law . . . has developed on the
assumption that the gift tax liability is that of the donor''); Miller, Tlte Federal G!ft Tax: Rate
Revision, 51 A.B.A. J. 333, 333 (1965).
57. MR. MILLS. As a matter of information who is to pay the tax?
MR. GREEN of Iowa. The amendment does not specifically provide who is to pay
the tax, but the bill provides that one shall be paid, and under the general provisions
of estate taxes the tax would be a lien upon the amount of the gift. The Tax, following the ordinary procedure, would be paid by the man who makes the gift. As a
matter of fact, I assume it would be taken out of the gift and paid by the party who
receives it
MR. MILLS. The gentleman said that the man who receives the gift should pay on
it It is not clear, because now the gentleman says the donor will pay the tax.
MR. GREEN of Iowa~ I did not say who should pay it
MR. MILLS. Surely the gentleman has not introduced an amendment so indefinite
that he can not say whether the donor or the donee will pay the tax?
MR. GREEN of Iowa. Oh, the donor will have to pay the tax if it is not paid by the
donee.

MR. LONGWORTH. I am in the same situation as the gentleman from New York
[Mr. MILLS] seems to be. Suppose the gift were real estate. Who would pay the tax
in that case, and what would it be?
MR. GREEN of Iowa. It would be paid by the donor if the donee does not pay it I
would think the donee would be content to pay it

MR. GREEN of Iowa. It is immaterial whether the donor or the donee pays it The
Government will get the money in any event; but the donor is responsible under the
amendment, for the reason that it is drawn to correspond with the estate tax. There
is no reason why the donor should not If a man keeps the property until the time of
the death of the decedent, his estate would have to pay it These large gifts are made
in a large number of cases for the purpose of evading the tax, and they would have
the effect of defeating the tax imposed on an estate.
65 CONG. REc. 3120 (1924).
.
58. See text at notes 23-24 supra.
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the transfer of appreciated property59 and when that gain will be
realized. Most donors make the first decision by comparing their
tax rates with the rates of their donees:
If the donee's tax rate is lower than the donor's, the property can be
transferred in kind and then sold by the donee at a lower tax cost than
the donor would incur. If the donor's tax rate is lower than the donee's, the property can be sold in advance of the gift and the cash proceeds transferred net of tax. 60

Similarly, the donor can either sell the property and give cash or
simply transfer the property depending on when it is most advantageous to realize gain.
Congress' intent to allow donors to transfer property without realizing gain is strikingly evinced in the recaptui:e provisions, sections
1245 and 1250.61 Section 1245, which basically applies to depreciable personal property, seeks to prevent taxpayers from converting
ordinary income into capital gains by first taking depreciation deductions to offset ordinary income and then obtaining capital gains
tax rates on the amount realized when the property is sold. 62 Subject to certain exceptions, section 1250 applies the same principle to
depreciable realty when depreciation deductions exceed straight line
depreciation for property disposed of within ten years. 63 Sections
1245(b)(l) and 1250(d)(l), however, exempt donative transfers from
the recapture of depreciation provisions. 64 The House Report on
section 1250 explained: "The effect . . . is to treat the donor and
donee for purposes of this provision as if they were one person.
"65

Because the part-sale, part-gift theory forces donors to realize
59. See M. CHlRELSTEIN, supra note 55, at 54-57; cf. Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1928)
(donee taxed on appreciation that took place while donor held property); Rice v. Eisner, 16
F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 764 (1927) (same).
60. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 55, at 56-57.
61. I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250.
62. See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 95 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707, 801.
63. See S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 131-32, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG,
& AD. NEWS 1673, 1805-06. For a survey of the immediate response to these provisions, sec
Horvitz, Sections 1250 & 1245: Tlte Puddle & Tlte Lake, 20 TAX L. REv. 285 (1965); Kcrcstcr &
Katcher, Gainfrom .Dispositions of Certain .Depreciable Property- Section 1245 oftlte Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 15 W. REs. L. REv. 281 (1964); Ruffner, Gain from .Dispositions of
Certain .Depreciable Property- Section 1245, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 619 (1963); Shapiro, Recapture of.Depreciation & Section 1245 oftlte Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L. J. 1483 (1963);
Comment, .Depreciation Recapture - Sections 1245 and 1250 of tlte Internal Revenue Code of
1954, 37 U. COLO, L. REV. 469 (1965).
64. I.R.C. §§ 1245(b)(l), 1250(d)(l). See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Scss. 67
(1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 471 ("no gain is recognized at the time of disposition. • • • the
ordinary income potential ••. carries over into the hands of the donce."); S. REP. No. 1881,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 707, 803 (''the depreciation deductions
of the donor must be taken into account by the donce, and may result in ordinary income to
him if he sells the property.").
65. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 105, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1313, 1413-14.
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gain when they transfer appreciated property,66 it flies in the face of
Congress' desire to ensure that gifts would not create income tax liabilities for donors. It does this, moreover, even though the purposes
of the gift tax are fulfilled without making donors realize gain. The
gift tax supplements the income and estate taxes.67 It is intended,
first, to prevent donors from avoiding estate taxes by making inter
vivas gifts68 and, second, to prevent donors from ~voiding income
taxes by splitting income among family members or trusts. 69
By virtue of its supplementary role, the gift tax assumes the purposes of the estate and income taxes. The primary functions of the
estate tax include preventing undue accumulations of wealth,70 taxThe first exemption is for gifts. Thus, the making of a gift for this purpose will not be
a taxable event. However, the depreciation deductions of the donor in such a case are
carried over to the donee. If the donee subsequently sells the real property, there may be
ordinary income recognized by him as a result of depreciation deductions taken by the
donor. The donee, ii:1. such a case, however, will receive the benefit of the holding period
of the donor. The effect, therefore, of this if to treat the donor and doneefar purposes ofthe
provision as !fthey were oneperson with the result that upon subsequent sale by the donee
of the property, the same amount (if any) will be treated as ordinary income as if the
donor held the property throughout the entire period.
Id. (emphasis added); see S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 135, reprinted in [1964] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1809.
·
66. See Brief for the Respondent at 8-9, 11-19, Diedrich v. Commissioner, cert. granted,
102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2204).
·
61. See, e.g., Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939) ("gift tax is supplementary to the estate tax"); H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932), reprinted in 19391 C.B. 477 ("gift tax will supplement both the estate tax and income tax"); Harriss, Legislative
Hiftory of Federal G!ft Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 538 (1940).
68. See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 333 (1932) (Stone, 1,, dissenting) ("to prevent or compensate for the withdrawal of property·by gifts inter vivos from operation of the
estate tax"); W. SHULTZ & C. HARRiss, AMERICAN PuBuc FINANCE 452 (6th ed. 1954); Alexander, sup,:a note 56, at 637; H ~ supra note 67, at 538; Magill, The Federal G!ft Tax, 40
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 773 (1940).
69. See Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 47 (1939) (e.g., "compensate for
the loss of surtax upon income"); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1932), reprinted in
1939-1 C.B. 504; W. SHULTZ & C. HARRiss, supra note 68, at 452.
The American Law Institute presents the most comprehensive list of objectives:
(1) to produce revenue;
(2) to unpose reasonable restrictions on the inheritance of wealth;
(3) to guard against the destruction of incentives to accumulate wealth;
(4) to reduce, if not eliminate, the circumstances under which the form of transfer will
affect the tax result;
(5) to have a tax system that is readily understandable in normal and routine transfer
situations;
·
·
(6) to treat taxpayers similarly situated in the same manner; and
(1) to produce a tax structure that will be regarded as fair.
READINGS IN DEATH & GIFr TAX.REFORM I (G. Goldstein ed. 1971) (citing ALI, RECOMMENDATIONS ON EsTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 78 (1969)).
70. See, e.g., Bloch, Economic Objectives of Gratuitous Tranefer Taxation, 4 NATL. TAX. J.
139, 140 (1951); Casner,American Law Institute Federal Estate & G!ft Tax Project, 22 TAX. L.
REv. 515, 518 (1967); Dodge, supra note 53, at 1189; Klein, supra note 53, at 239-40. Some
commentators emphasize decreasing concentrations of wealth. See C. SHOUP, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFr TAXES 100-01, 128 (1966) (anti-concentration) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL
EsTATE AND GIFr TAXES]; C. SHOUP, supra note 43, at 372; Klein, supra note 53, at 231-40;
Kurtz & Surrey, Reform ofDeath and G!ft Taxes: The 1969 Treasury Proposals, The Criticism
and a Rebuttal, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1367 (1970).
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ing property once a generation,71 and trucing windfalls to the recipient.72 When the donee pays the gift tax, these purposes are satisfied
even though the donor does not recognize gain. The gift tax is also
designed to reduce that loss of income tax revenue that accompanies
gifts.73 The attainment of this goal is similarly unaffected by the
source of the gift tax payment. Although forcing the donor to recognize gain would marginally increase income tax receipts,74 it does so
only by undermining other important goals.75
Despite the inconsistency of the part-sale, part-gift theory and
71. See, e.g., FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFr TAXES, supra note 70, at 100-01; Kurtz & Surrey,
supra note 70, at 1367.
12. See, e.g., B. BITTKER. & L. STONE, supra note 43, at 984; FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT
TAXES, supra note 70, at 100-01; Casner, supra note 70, at 518; Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 70,
at 1367.
73. When the donee receives a gift of property the government can lose revenue in four
ways. First, the income tax on the donee's subsequent sale of the property will be less than if
the donor sold the property because donors are usually in higher tax brackets than donees.
See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text. A second loss of income ta,ces arises if the
property continually produces income, because that income is taxed at the donee's lower rate.
Third, these income tax losses are increased when the donor divides property among many
donees who are all in a lower tax bracket than the donor. The final loss of income to the
government results from the loss of the time value of the income tax the donor would have
paid had he sold the property.
Congress reenacted the gift tax in 1932 to compensate for these revenue losses: "[The gift
tax] will tend to reduce the incentive to make gifts in order that distribution of future income
from the donated property may be to a number of persons with the result that the ta,ces imposed by the higher brackets of the income tax law are avoided," H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 477; accord, Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 47 (1939) ("compensate for loss of surtax upon income"); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 179 n.1 (''prevent income tax avoidance .•. through ••. escaping the
effect of progressive surtax rates" (citations omitted)); Harriss, supra note 67, at 534 ("gift ta,c
. . . should have rates . • . high enough to protect the surtaxes"); Magill, supra note 68, at
773.
74. The part-sale, part-gift theory might even cause I} decrease in ta,c revenues. The theory's realization requirement forces donors to realize gain regardless of how the transaction is
structured. As a consequence, a donor may choose to hold property until he has sufficient
capital losses to minimize the tax impact of the gift. The donor may well hold the property
until death. In the former situation, the government loses the time value of the gift ta,c and
income tax; in the latter situation, the loss of gift tax revenue is compensated for by the estate
tax, but the government loses income tax revenue because the appreciated value of the property escapes taxation when the heirs receive a stepped up basis in the property. Thus, the partsale, part-gift theory's realization requirement may produce a "lock-in" effect similar to that
caused by § 1014, which could cause a loss in total tax revenues.
75. Incentives for gift giving, see note 52 supra, are justified on several policy·grounds.
The first is that incentives are needed to encourage the transfer of society's productive assets to
a younger generation at an earlier date, which will, in turn, produce a more aggressive, dynamic economic system. See Alexander, supra note 56, at 645; Jantscher, .Death and Gift Taxation in the United Stales After the Report ofthe Royal Commission, 22 NATL. TAX J. 121, 129
(1969); Miller, supra note 56, at 333-36. A second reason, which was advanced for excluding
the gift tax from the tax base, is that the "omission •.. [is] a partial offset to the disadvantage
of paying a tax at an earlier date than if the transfer had been postponed to death." FEDERAL
ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES, supra note 70, at 127; cf. Jantschner, supra, at 129-30 (criticizing the
above argument when it is made in favor of separate rate structures, but later accepting the
concept of incentives so long as there is a single progessive tax system). The third explanation,
which is a corollary to the second reason given above, is that the government may be willing to
discount gift taxes in order to increase revenues at an earlier date. See Harriss, supra note 67,
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congressional policy, the current Code requires courts to apply that
theory.76 But Congress can act to make the income tax consequences
of donees' gift tax payments consistent with its overall policy toward
gifts.77 In particular, Congress should amend the Code to make the
gift tax a shared obligation of the donor and donee, so that neither
party would realize income when the other pays the tax.78 This soluat 538 (suggesting that this was one of the original reasons for establishing gift giving
incentives).
76. It is well established that in tax cases, the Code's provisions are given their plain meaning if they are unambiguous. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I, 6 (1947) ("interpret
[words] in their ordinary, everyday senses" (citation omitted)); McFeely v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 102, 111 (1935); Lang v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 109, 113 (1933) (''if [tax is imposed] in
plain words, as it [is] here, the courts are not at liberty to modify the act by construction in
order to avoid special hardship"); Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1931)
(plain meaning preferred); United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931) (apply literal meaning unless result absurd); Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1930) (rule of strict construction applies with special force to tax statutes); Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on
Tax Administration, 58 HAR.v. L. REv. 477,521,522 (1945) (solution to statutory interpretation
must come under words of statute). Contra, Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HAR.v. L. REv.
863 (1930). See also, Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate .Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950) (suggesting that
for every rule of statutory construction there is corollary that reaches the opposite result).
77. See Note, Inheritance, Estate and Gift Taxes- Gift Tax -Income Tax-Tlze .Donor

ofa Gift Made Subject to tlte Condition that tlte .Donee Pay State and Federal Gift Taxes on tlte

Transfer Does Not Realize Taxable Income Even Though Gift Taxes Paid Exceed tlte Property's
At{fttsted Basis. - Hirst v. Commissioner, 572 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1978) (en bane), 47 U. CIN. L.
REv. 341, 347-48 (1978) (criticizing Hirst court for usurping legislative prerogative to establish
tax policies by providing donor with nonrecognition of gain). But see Cornell Note, supra note
IO, at 1085-86 (nonrecognition of donor's gain should not be allowed because "objections to
taxation of appreciation at the time of a net gift do not outweigh the benefits achieved in the
form of equal and fair administration of the income tax system").
78. The Regulations currently call for an increase in the donee's basis regardless of who
pays the gift tax. Treas. Reg.§ l.1015-5(b)(2) (1964) ("It is immaterial whether the gift tax is
paid by the donor or the donee."). The Treasury was following Congress' intent when it
promulgated the regulation. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 199, reprinted in [1958)
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NE.Ws 4791, 4988 (''It is immaterial whether the gift tax is paid by the
donor or donee."). Congress wanted to increase the basis to avoid double taxation:
In this case the "cost" is the cost of the property to the donor, adjusted for any subsequent
depreciation, etc. However, this ignores the fact that in reality there is another "cost"
incurred in transferring the property from the donor to the donee; namely, the gift tax,
which must be paid in order to make this transfer.
S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 70, reprinted in [1958) U.S. CoDE.·CONG. & AD NEWS
4791, 4859. See Groh, New Basisfar Property Acquired by Gift, 37 TAXES 545 (1959) (stating
that§ 1015(d)(l)(B) remedies the "inequity" that results when the donee pays the gift tax and
no adjustment is allowed).
In 1976, Congress reduced the amount of the basis increase to that percentage of the gift
tax attributable to the appreciation of the property's value in the hands of the donor. See Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005(c), 90 Stat. 1520, 1877 (1976) (codified at
I.R.C. § 1015(a)(6)). Congress enacted this limitation because, under prior law, the basis increase included the amount of the gift tax payment attributable to the donor's original basis in
the property. Double taxation, the concern that prompted adoption of the provision allowing
a basis increase for the gift tax payment, only affected the appreciated value of the gift. Thus,
Congress limited the basis increase to that amount. See JOINT COMMlTI'E.E. ON TAXATION,
supra note 52, at 561, 1976-3 C.B. at 573; H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 44, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3356, 3398. This Note's solution would not
doubly tax the same appreciation. The donee's basis would still be increased to reflect the
orginal gift tax payment.
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tion would reconcile congressional policy and the language of the
Code.
Although one could object that the proposed amendment produces a windfall to donors, this argument is unpersuasive. Even
though· the donor's supposed gain escapes taxation, the gift tax is
paid. The amendment reduces only the potential income tax liability
that arises from having to sell part of an appreciated asset to pay the
gift tax. But the possibility of such a reduction inheres in a single
unit analysis, and Congress has been willing to forgo income tax revenue in other contexts to preserve single unit treatment for donors
and donees. 79
CONCLUSION

J)iedrich v. Commissioner 80 poses a dilemma that only Congress

should resolve. Section 2502(c) requires donors to pay gift taxes, and
the Supreme Court's decision in Old Colony Trust suggests that donors incur taxable gain when their donees pay those taxes. The conclusions logically demanded of the Court in J)iedrich - that the
part-sale, part-gift theory applies and that the donors hav~ received
taxable gains to the extent that their donees' gift tax payments have
exceeded their adjusted bases - are inconsistent with Congress'
present tax treatment of gifts. But the tax law is not properly subjected Jo judicial activism, and the Court should, therefore, leave it
to Congress to reconcile its policies with the Code's language.

19. See text at notes 53-55, 61-65 supra.
80. 643 F.2d 499 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 89 (1981) (No. 80-2204).

